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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 Congress sought to
accomplish many goals, some of which appear internally incompat-
ible. For example, Congress enacted section 523(a)(8) to limit the
dischargeability of educational loans in Chapter 7 liquidations. At
the same time, however, Congress enacted the new Chapter 13 to
encourage consumer debtors-including student borrowers-to
elect repayment plans whenever feasible.3 Chapter 13 contains a
"superdischarge" provision, which offers debtors a much broader
discharge than the discharge that is available under section 523(a)
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (relevant
sections codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982). The section provides for the nondischargeability of any
debt:
(8) for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or
made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a non-
profit institution of higher education, unless-
(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of any applicable sus-
pension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents;...
Id.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982). According to the legislative history, "[T]he purpose
of chapter 13 is to enable an individual, under court supervision and protection, to develop
and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over an extended period." H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977). The plan must meet the requirements of
§ 1325(a) to receive court confirmation. See infra note 77 (text of provision). Several arti-
cles discuss the provisions of Chapter 13. See, e.g., Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tem-
pest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 AhL BANKR L.J. 271 (1981); Hughes, Chap-
ter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C.L. REv. 831 (1980); Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303 (1979); Note, "Good Faith" and Confirmation of Chapter 13 Compo-
sition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal, 65 MINN. L. REv. 659 (1981).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982). The section provides:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the
plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor
after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge
of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title, ex-
cept any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
Id. The two exceptions relate to long term debts and alimony or support payments,
respectively.
EDUCATIONAL LOANS
in straight bankruptcy. While section 523(a)(8) excepts educational
loans from discharge, section 1328(a) of Chapter 13 does not ex-
cept them from discharge.
This Article examines the tension that seems to exist between
these two Bankruptcy Code provisions. Part II discusses the nature
of federal educational loan programs. Part III reviews the legisla-
tive history of section 523(a)(8) to evaluate Congress' intent and
purpose. Part III then inspects the history and operation of section
1328(a), Chapter 13's "superdischarge" provision, to see whether
the two sections are reconcilable. Part IV analyzes recent decisions
that attempt to reconcile these two code provisions through the
good faith requirement of section 1325(a). Part V considers the ap-
propriateness of excepting educational loans from discharge in
bankruptcy. Part V concludes that a court asked to confirm a re-
payment plan that will result in the discharge of educational loans
best serves Congress' purposes by analyzing the totality of circum-
stances when making an inquiry into the "good faith" of a pro-
posed plan. Finally, part V discusses the way recent congressional
legislation implements the "totality of circumstances" test.
II. EDUCATIONAL LOAN PROGRAMS
For prospective college students, finding the resources to fi-
nance a college education can be a difficult task. Although students
theoretically have access to the loan market, in practice, most stu-
dents lack the resources necessary to participate as borrowers. Stu-
dents are trapped in a "catch-22" situation: they desire an educa-
tion because it can lead to greater financial security, but lack the
financial resources to purchase the education and the collateral to
secure loans to finance the education. Congress designed federal
educational loan programs5 to fill this void. These programs enable
students who do not have access to the private lending market to
borrow funds either directly from the federal government or from
private lenders who receive federal guarantees.
5. These programs include the National Direct Student Loans, see infra notes 6-14
and accompanying text, and the Guaranteed Student Loans, see infra notes 15-29 and ac-
companying text. See The National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72
Stat. 1580, 1581 (repealed 1972); Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat.
1219, 1236.
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A. National Direct Student Loan Program
The federal government has assisted college students in fi-
nancing their educational endeavors since Congress passed the Na-
tional Defense Education Act of 1958,6 which created the National
Direct Student Loan (NDSL) program.7 The federal government
funds the NDSL program through annual appropriations of loan
capital.8 To participate in the program, an institution of higher ed-
ucation must agree to contribute one dollar for every nine dollars
that the government contributes." These capital contributions cre-
ate a loan fund from which an institution may lend to students
who demonstrate financial need.10 A student may borrow up to
$6000 for undergraduate studies, with a $12,000 limit on combined
graduate and undergraduate studies.11 Six months after ceasing
studies on at least a half-time basis, a student borrower must begin
to repay any loans; he may then take up to ten years to complete
repayment.12 Finally, the loan program administrator may give a
student borrower an unlimited forbearance in the event of finan-
cial distress,' 3 and the borrower may defer payments in a variety of
other situations.'
B. Guaranteed Student Loans
The Higher Education Act of 196515 established the Guaran-
teed Student Loan (GSL) program's and expanded the government
role in financing higher educational opportunities. The government
does not provide capital for GSLs as it does for NDSLs. Instead,
6. Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580, 1581 (repealed 1972).
7. Following the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 137(b), 86
Stat. 235, 272-73, Congress transferred current funding and other provisions to the Higher
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). Since 1972, the loans under the program have been named National Direct Student
Loans (NDSLs). The NDSL statutes are codified in 20 US.C. §§ 1087aa to 1087ii (1982).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa(b) (1982).
9. Id. § 1087cc(a)(2). Although colleges and universities comprise the great majority of
institutions of higher learning, the statute allows proprietary institutions and unaccredited
institutions to participate as well. Id. § 1141(a).
10. Id. § 1087dd(b).
11. Id. § 1087dd(a)(2).
12. Id. 9 1087dd(c)(1)(A).
13. Id. § 1080(c).
14. Id. § 1087dd(c)(2)(A). The student borrower can defer repayment if he pursues
studies at another institution, or serves in the Armed Forces, Peace Corps, or VISTA. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071 to 1087-4 (1982).
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the Department of Education (DOE) 17 provides loan guarantees to
encourage lenders to make private capital available for student
loans.18
Two systems exist for "guaranteeing" student loans. These
systems operate at both the state and federal level. Under the state
agency program, a state, 9 or a private, nonprofit agency within the
state,20 acts as the direct insurer of student loans, while the DOE
serves as secondary guarantor. 21 Under the Federal Insured Stu-
dent Loan (FISL) program, the DOE acts as the direct insurer of
loans.2 To participate in the FISL program, lenders must show
that they cannot receive insurance from a state or private agency.23
Furthermore, an educational institution that desires to participate
in the FISL program may lend only to students who are unable to
obtain GSLs through a state agency program.24 This provision in-
dicates the DOE's preference to serve as a secondary guarantor
rather than a primary guarantor. As of 1982, all fifty states had
created state guarantee agencies. 25 Accordingly, state agencies cur-
rently provide the vast majority of guaranteed student loans.2 6
Under both the state and federal programs, the same terms
apply. Borrowers need not show financial need, but may borrow
only to the extent that educational costs exceed other financial
aid.2 7 Students may borrow up to $2500 in any academic year, with
an aggregate limit of $12,500 for undergraduate studies. Students
17. The Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 201, 93 Stat.
668, 671 (1979), 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (1982), created the DOE as an executive department. The
Act transferred to the DOE all duties formerly held by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, and its predecessor, the Office of Education, under various higher education
acts. Id. § 301(a)(2), 93 Stat. 677, 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(2).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1982). The DOE also pays a portion of the interest on the
loans while the student borrowers are enrolled in school. Id.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b) (1982).
20. Id. The DOE treats state agencies and private agencies the same under the GSL
program, reimbursing the agencies for at least 80% of their losses resulting from defaults.
Id. § 1078(c)(1)(A). If the state agency keeps default payments within a prescribed limit,
thereby assuring the availability of loan funds, the DOE will pay a higher percentage of the
losses. In some cases the DOE will pay up to 100% of the loss. Id. § 1078(c)(1)(B).
21. Id. § 1078 (c)(1)(A).
22. Id. § 1073.
23. Id. § 1073(b)(2).
24. Id. § 1073(b)(1).
25. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, GUARANTEED STUDENT
LOANS: A BACKGROUND PAPER, REPORT No. 1, at 30 (1982) [hereinafter cited as STUDENT
FINANCIAL REPORT].
26. In 1981 for example, almost 95% of GSLs came through the state agency pro-
grams. Id. at 30; see infra note 30.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(a)(2)(C)(v) (1982).
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may further borrow up to $5000 for any academic year of graduate
studies, with a total aggregate limit of $25,000.28 The repayment
schedule of GSLs parallels the NDSL schedule.2 9
C. Borrowers' Actions and Congressional Response
Growing participation in the federal student loan programs
has generated a tremendous volume of loan commitments for the
government.30 By 1981, the federal government was guaranteeing
almost eight billion dollars in GSLs annually, bringing its cumula-
tive loan volume to almost thirty billion dollars.31 Naturally, as the
number of student borrowers began to grow, the number of stu-
dents who sought to have loans discharged in bankruptcy also in-
creased.3 2 Congress responded to this perceived problem by enact-
ing a provision that excepted educational loans from discharge in
certain circumstances. 3 Although this provision excepted educa-
tional loans from discharge in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings,
Congress did not similarly restrict the discharge of educational
28. Id. § 1075(a).
29. See id. § 1077(a)(2); see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing for-
bearance and deferrals under the NDSL program).
30. The National Commission on Student Financial Assistance compiled data on
yearly and cumulative loan volumes under the GSL program. See STUDENT FINANCIAL RE-
PORT, supra note 25, at 25.
Trends in GSL Borrowing
Loan Volume
(millions of dollars)
1966-69 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981
FISL 284 484 655 661 500 541 504 427
State Agency 1135 531 516 637 1037 2443 4336 7308
Total 1419 1015 1171 1298 1537 2984 4840 7735
Cumulative* 1419 3245 5640 8078 11443 16385 21225 28960
*The cumulative volume is the total amount lent in the given year and all preceding years.
Id. The elimination of the $25,000 ceiling on loan recipients' income, Act of Nov. 1, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-566, § 5(b)(1)(A), 92 Stat. 2402, 2403, is responsible for the dramatic increase
in borrowing after 1977. Concerned about excessive government spending, President Reagan
reinstituted some of the restrictions on the availability of student loans. See Act of Aug. 31,
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 532(a), 95 Stat. 358, 451. This provision required a showing of
need for students whose family income exceeded a new ceiling of $30,000. Currently Presi-
dent Reagan is signaling that the government may need to make further cuts in student
financial aid. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at A16, col. 6.
31. See STUDENT FINANcIAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 25-26.
32. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
33. Guaranteed Student Loan Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90
Stat. 2081, 2099 (1976) (codified in 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976) (repealed 1978)). In 1978, Con-
gress adopted almost identical language to § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
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loans in repayment plans filed under Chapter 13."'
Congress' apparently inconsistent treatment of the dis-
chargeability of educational loans in bankruptcy has caused much
judicial confusion, especially in courts faced with an increasing
number of composition plans3 5 that offer nominal repayment of
educational loans.3 6 The 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments,3 7 by
further encouraging the use of Chapter 13 composition plans, may
exacerbate this problem. In addition, with an ever-increasing num-
ber of loans entering repayment status, the number of bankrupt-
cies inevitably will increase, even if the percentage of bankruptcies
remains constant.3 8 These developments make this an appropriate
time both to review the Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to
educational loans and to ascertain the appropriate judicial re-
sponse to the apparent inconsistencies between those provisions.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. Chapter 7: Legislative History of Section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978s9 governs liq-
uidation proceedings, or straight bankruptcies. In a straight bank-
ruptcy a debtor liquidates all nonexempt assets and distributes
them to creditors.40 In exchange, the debtor receives a discharge of
all debts except obligations, such as educational loans, that section
523(a) specifically excepts from discharge. 1 Prior to the Reform
34. See infra notes 172-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the apparent
tension between the discharge provisions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
35. Repayment plans under Chapter 13 can be either full or partial payment plans.
Partial payment plans also are known as composition plans. These terms will be used
interchangeably.
36. See, e.g., In re Vensel, 39 Bankr. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re Hawkins, 33
Bankr. 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Mitruka, 19 Bankr. 516 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In
re Smith, 8 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); In re Eichelberger, 6 Bankr. 705 (Bankr. S.D.
Miss. 1980).
37. See 11 US.C. § 707(b) and Form 1 paras. 6 & 7 (as amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 93-353, § 322, 98 Stat. 333,
357).
38. See STUDENT FINANcIAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 26. The dramatic increase in
borrowing from 1979-81, following the elimination of the income ceiling, see supra note 30,
has expanded both the cumulative volume of loans, and the percentage not yet in repay-
ment. STUDENT FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 24, 26.
39. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 701-66, 92 Stat. 2549,
2603-21 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982)).
40. For a list of exemptions, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)-(11) (1982).
41. Other nondischargeable debts include debts for taxes and debts obtained by fraud.
See id. § 523(a)(1)-(9).
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Act, bankruptcy law did not except educational loans.4 The only
deterrent to student borrowers seeking to discharge loans in bank-
ruptcy was the moral and social stigma associated with bank-
ruptcy.4 3 Because Congress believed this deterrent was insufficient
to prevent student borrowing abuses of the bankruptcy laws, Con-
gress undertook to restrict the availability of discharge.
1. The Guaranteed Student Loan Amendments of 1976 and the
New Section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1965
Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 traces
its roots to a proposal of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States.44 In 1973, the Commission submitted a report
to Congress recommending sweeping changes in the bankruptcy
laws.45 The report included a proposal that excepted educational
loans from discharge in bankruptcy.4 That year, Congress acted to
42. See In re Holzer, 33 Bankr. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). Following the Guar-
anteed Student Loan Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-452, § 127a, 90 Stat. 2081, 2099-
2100 (repealed 1978), Congress excepted student loans from discharge through the Higher
Education Act of 1965. For a discussion of the validity of using this Act to except loans from
discharge, see infra note 57.
43. The stigma associated with bankruptcy can be significant. See H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 105-107 (1977) (statement of Rep. James G. O'Hara). Congressman
O'Hara stated:
[B]ankruptcy is a serious step .... [I]t involves the distribution of [a debtor's] assets
and much of his income among his creditors .... [Ilt is basically damaging to the
credit and personal reputation of those forced to go through it. . . . [It] is not and has
never been designed to be an 'easy way out' for the bankrupt. Bankruptcy, for most of
those who enter into it, carries its own deleterious consequences.
Id. at 150. One commentator, however, has noted that the moral stigma appears to be less of
a deterrent than in the past. Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hardship": The Dis-
charge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 457, 461 (1981).
44. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, HR.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, pt. II, 136 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bankr. Comm'n
Report]. Congress created the Bankruptcy Commission in 1970 to review the former bank-
ruptcy laws and propose a revised bankruptcy act. S.J. Res. 88, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1970). For further discussion of the legislative history of § 523(a)(8), see
Ahart, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANIK. L.J. 201 (1978); Kosel,
supra note 43; Pawlik, Student Loan Bankruptcies: A Chapter 13 Revival?, 5 J. EDUc. FIN.
452 (1980); Note, Skipping Out on Alma Mater: Some Problems Involving the Collection of
Federal Student Loans, 15 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 317 (1980).
45. See Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pts. I & 11.
46. Section 4-506(a)(8) of the proposed Act read as follows:
§ 4-506. Exceptions from Discharge; Determination of Dischargeability and Liability
on Nondischargeable Debt.
(a) Exceptions from Discharge. A discharge extinguishes all debts of an individual
debtor, whether or not allowable, except the following:
(8) any educational debt if the first payment of any installment thereof was due on
1094
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limit the dischargeability of educational loans when it considered a
bankruptcy reform bill patterned after the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion's proposed code.47 The political process, however, delayed the
new bankruptcy act until 1978.48 Congress, nonetheless, remained
concerned about educational loans and included a provision as part
of the Guaranteed Student Loan Amendments of 1976 that added
a new section 439A to the Higher Education Act of 1965 limiting
the discharge of educational loans in bankruptcy proceedings. 49
With this legislation Congress intended to attack the per-
ceived abuse by student borrowers of the bankruptcy discharge
provisions.50 Section 439A restricted the discharge of an educa-
a date less than five years prior to the date of the petition and if its payment from
future income or other wealth will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his
dependents;...
Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pt. H, at 136.
The Bankruptcy Commission Report contains the following rationale for the exception
to discharge:
Examples of the abuse of the discharge in the case of educational loans have also
come to the Commission's attention. Some individuals have financed their education
and upon graduation have filed petitions under the Bankruptcy Act and obtained a
discharge without any attempt to repay the educational loan and without the presence
of any extenuating circumstance, such as illness. The Commission is of the opinion that
not only is this reprehensible but that it poses a threat to the continuance of educa-
tional loan programs.
Id. pt. I, at 122-23 (footnotes omitted).
47. H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
48. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
49. Guaranteed Student Loan Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90
Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed 1978) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)). The provision reads
in pertinent part:
§ 1087-3. Five-year nondischargeability of certain loan debts; effective date.
(a) A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part
may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only if such
discharge is granted after the five-year period. . . beginning on the date of commence-
ment of the repayment period of such loan, except that prior to the expiration of the
five year-period, such loan may be released only if the court in which the proceeding is
pending determines that payment from future income or other wealth will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents.
Id. Congress repealed 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1976). The Report of the
House Committee on Education and Labor described the purpose of § 439A as follows:
The Committee adopted an amendment which would have the effect of preventing
the discharge of student loans through a bankruptcy proceeding if the bankruptcy peti-
tion were filed before the loan has been in repayment for five years. The amendment
was adopted in the light of testimony that the bankruptcy rate involving student loans
has increased significantly in the last several years and that in some areas of the coun-
try students are being counseled on filing for bankruptcy to discharge their obligation
to repay guaranteed student loans.
Id. at 13.
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tional loan for five years from the date repayment commenced.5 1
Section 439A, however, did not apply to as broad a class of loans as
the Commission proposal. Instead, the new section restricted only
the discharge of insured or guaranteed loans. 52 Furthermore, sec-
tion 439A lowered the standard for discharging an educational loan
during the five-year delay period. The section allowed discharge if
excepting the loan from discharge would cause "undue hardship on
the debtor or his dependents."5 3
Following testimony and lengthy debate, Congress enacted
section 439A as part of the Guaranteed Student Loan Amend-
ments of 1976." Curious circumstances surrounded the passage of
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare described the purpose of § 439A
as follows:
[Section 439A is designed] to eliminate the defense of bankruptcy for a five-year pe-
riod, to avoid the situation where a student, upon graduation, files for a discharge of
his loan obligation in bankruptcy, then enters upon his working career free of the debt
he rightfully owes. After a five-year period, an individual who has been faithfully re-
paying his loan may really become bankrupt. He should not be denied this right, and is
not under the Committee bill.
S. REP. No. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1978) (quoted supra note 49). Congress appar-
ently based its choice of the five-year period on a 1975 study by the New Jersey State Guar-
antee Loan Program which demonstrated that bankruptcy filings on the average occurred
two and one-half years after the last loan. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31
and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judici-
ary Comm., 94th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess. 1074 (1976) (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.)
[hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Hearings]. A private, nonprofit guarantee agency per-
formed a study some years earlier which showed that 98% of bankruptcy filings occurred
within five years of departure from school. See Letter from Elmer Staats, Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, to Representative Don Edwards (Dec. 23, 1976), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1977). Furthermore, bankruptcies filed after the
five-year period are more likely to occur because of exigent circumstances than because of a
desire to escape a nettlesome obligation. See Kosel, supra note 43, at 465.
52. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1978) (quoted supra note 49) with
Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pt. II, § 1-102(23), at 3.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added) (quoted supra note
49). The Bankruptcy Commission proposal allowed discharges only if excepting the loan
from discharge would cause undue hardship on the debtor and his dependents. Bankr.
Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pt. II, § 4-506(a)(8), at 136. The legislative history contains
no reference to the reason for this change. Furthermore, Congress provided no guidance for
courts faced with interpreting the meaning of "undue hardship." The Bankruptcy Commis-
sion, however, had attempted to give the concept some substance. Id. at 140-41 & n.17.
Several witnesses also spoke to the issue at the hearings on the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
Bankruptcy Hearings, supra note 51, at 1069-70 (testimony of Rep. Ray Thornton), 1092-93
(testimony of Rep. Erlenborn), 1097 (testimony of Sheldon Steinbach). For a more complete
discussion of "undue hardship" see Ahart, supra note 44; Kosel, supra note 43.
54. Guaranteed Student Loan Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90
Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed 1978) (quoted supra note 49). For an analysis of the policy argu-
ments in favor of and against the exception to discharge see infra notes 65-71, 172-189 and
accompanying text.
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this provision. Because the entire federal student loan program
faced expiration and needed reauthorization, the House Commit-
tee on Education and Labor had to rush to the House floor the bill
to which the provision was attached.5 As a result, the provision
never was referred to the House Judiciary Committee56 and was
implemented through the Higher Education Act of 1965, in title
20, rather than through the Bankruptcy Act, in title 11.2 To give
the House Judiciary Committee time to collect more data and re-
view the provision in conjunction with the complete revision of the
bankruptcy laws, Congress chose to delay the effective date of the
exception to discharge until September 30, 1977.58
2. Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
When Congress finally turned its attention to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Congress focused again on the discharge of
educational loans in bankruptcy. In May 1977, the House Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, armed with the GAO
study that the Subcommittee had requested the previous year,59
55. See Letter from Representative Edwards to Representative Erlenborn (June 16,
1977), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1977).
56. Id. In his letter to Representative Erlenborn, Edwards cited two other reasons for
not seeking sequential referral at the time Congress considered and enacted § 439A. First,
the data on student loan bankruptcies was incomplete and insufficient for reasoned deci-
sionmaking. Second the Subcommittee was already beginning its major revision of the bank-
ruptcy laws and chose to delay consideration of the matter until the Reform Act came
before the Subcommittee. Id. To obtain better data on student loan bankruptcies, Repre-
sentatives O'Hara and Edwards asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to do a "thor-
ough study of the problem." Id.; see Letter from Representatives Edwards and O'Hara to
Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats (Dec. 23, 1976), reprinted in HR. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1977).
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1978). If Congress had been in less of a
hurry, it might have realized that the former Bankruptcy Act required exceptions to dis-
charge to be contained within the Act. 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1976) (repealed 1979). This statu-
tory conflict created mixed results in the courts. Some courts held that § 1(15) barred appli-
cation of § 1087-3 in bankruptcy proceedings. See Note, supra note 44, at 336 n.144 (citing
In re Vittek, 19 COLLIER BANK& CAS. 2D (MB) 65 (N.D. Ohio 1978)). Other courts, less
literal in interpreting the statutes, enforced § 1087-3, reasoning that it constructively
amended the former Bankruptcy Act. See Note, supra note 44, at 336 n.144 (citing In re
Payton, 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 147 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
58. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1977).
59. Id. at 134-45 (1977). Among other things contained in the GAO study, the statis-
tics demonstrated that less than one percent of all matured loans were discharged in bank-
ruptcy-a figure that compared favorably with statistics for the consumer finance industry.
Id. at 133. Furthermore, the GAO found that educational loans constituted more than 80%
of the debtor's total indebtedness in only 20% of the filings studied. Id. This statistic re-
futed the contention that student borrowers were filing for bankruptcy just to discharge
educational loans.
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unanimously agreed that educational loans merited the same treat-
ment as other loans.6 0 The Subcommittee reported out a bill con-
taining a provision that would repeal section 439A of the Higher
Education Act of 1965.61 In July of the same year, the House Judi-
ciary Committee considered the issue and, in accordance with the
Subcommittee's position, rejected an amendment that would have
made educational loans nondischargeable e2 Because the House
took no action on the measure before September 30, 1977, how-
ever, section 439A of the Higher Education Act automatically went
into effect.63 Nonetheless, the bill did not appear to have much
staying power.
In February 1978, Congress breathed new life into the nondis-
chargeability of educational loans in bankruptcy when the House
considered an amendment that would add section 523(a)(8) to the
Bankruptcy Code.6 4 Proponents of the -amendment argued that the
unique nature of student loans mandated special treatment under
the Bankruptcy Code.6 5 Furthermore, the proponents maintained
that the amendment was needed to keep student loan programs
60. Id. at 132.
61. The Subcommittee deleted the exception to discharge in H.R. 7330. See Letter
from Representative Edwards to Ronald J. Iverson (June 15, 1977), reprinted in HR. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 155-56 (1977). The deletion later became § 316 of H.R. 8200.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 129 n.78 (1977).
62. HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1977). Opposition to the amendment
came from the Consumer Bankers Association, the National Bankruptcy Conference, the
National Student Lobby, and the National Student Association. Id. at 132-33. The vote in
the House Judiciary Committee was 4 to 23. Id. at 132.
63. 124 CONG. Rac. H1792 (daffy ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dodd).
64. The original text of § 523(a)(8) appears in 124 CONG. Rac. H1791 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel). The provision states:
(8) for a loan insured or guaranteed under part B of title IV of the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1071 et. seq.) if-
(A) such loan first becomes due-
(i) within five years before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) after the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will not impose
an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;...
Id. The present text of § 523(a)(8), which appears supra note 2, includes loans that a gov-
ernmental unit makes, insures, or guarantees, not just loans that it insures or guarantees.
Congress effected this change in the Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 3, 93 Stat.
387. Congress intended to incorporate loans that the government provided to profit-making
institutions as well as loans made to nonprofit institutions under § 439A of the Higher Edu-
cation Act prior to its repeal. See Wickham, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13: Guiding Consumer
Debtor Choice Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 815, 819 n.24 (1980).
65. 124 CONG. REc. H1791-93 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Reps. Ertel, Mottl,
and Erlenborn).
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intact.66 Opponents of the measure, on the other hand, contended
that excepting educational loans from discharge conflicted with the
traditional policies of bankruptcy-the fresh start for debtors and
the equal treatment of creditors. 7 Opponents also argued that the
GAO report demonstrated that the bankruptcy "problem" had
been blown out of proportion."
Representative Michel focused on a different aspect of the
controversy. He was less concerned with the dollar amounts at
stake and more concerned with the question of individual and
moral responsibility6 He emphasized the need to give moral sup-
port to the men and women who were responsible enough to repay
federal loans, and he stated that the amendment did just that be-
cause it did not allow easy discharges to individuals not truly in
need.70 Representative Ford argued that any federal program
designed to put millions of students through college would have
associated costs.7 1
When the debate ended, the Committee of the Whole passed
the amendment,72 which later became part of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.73 Congress had made clear its intent: educational
66. 124 CONG. REc. H1791 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ertel).
67. 124 CONG. REc. H1793 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dodd). Represen-
tative Dodd claimed that the exception to discharge discriminated against the class of stu-
dent borrowers. Id.
68. 124 CONo. RE C. H1792-93 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Dodd), H1795-
96 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford).
69. 124 CONG. REc. H1795 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Michel).
70. Id. Representative Michel stated that even a few well-publicized bankruptcies are
sufficient to erode the morale of responsible student borrowers. Id.
71. Id. (remarks of Rep. Ford); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 134
(1977) ("It is inappropriate to view the program as social legislation when granting the
loans, but strictly as business when attempting to collect. Such inconsistency does not
square with general bankruptcy policy.").
72. The vote was 54 to 26 in favor of the amendment. 124 CONG. REc. H1798 (daily ed.
Feb. 1, 1978). At the same time, the Committee rejected, by a vote of 34 to 21, an amend-
ment that would have limited the exception to discharge to debtors whose educational loans
equaled more than 65% of total indebtedness. Id.
73. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8), 92 Stat. 2549, 2591
(1978). The effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was October 1, 1979. Id. § 402(a),
92 Stat. 2682 (1978). Section 402(d), however, provided that § 317 repealed § 1087-3 on the
date of enactment, November 6, 1978. Id. § 402(d), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). Thus, Congress
created a "gap" period, during which educational loans were apparently dischargeable. Sec-
tion 403(a), however, provided that courts should treat cases commenced prior to the effec-
tive date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act as if Congress had not passed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act. Obviously, this procedure led to some confusion. See Note, supra note 44, at
343 n.189 (comparing In re Edson, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 8 (D. Nev. 1979) (hold-
ing that Congress did not repeal § 1087-3) with In re Utterback, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D
(MB) 151 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that Congress repealed § 1087-3)).
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loans were unique. Students could no longer discharge the obliga-
tion to repay the loans, and aid the continued vitality of the loan
programs, without a showing of undue hardship. To determine
whether Congress carried forth this purpose, an examination of
Chapter 13 is necessary.
B. Chapter 13. The Legislative History of Section 1328(a)
Chapter 13 governs repayment plans of debtors who have a
regular income. 4 The foundation of any repayment plan is the
debtor's future income, not his present assets.7 Unlike a Chapter 7
liquidation, which the court can process with little involvement, a
Chapter 13 repayment plan requires judicial confirmation.7" A
debtor seeking confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan must demon-
strate that his plan meets the six requirements of section 1325(a).77
Apparently, when Congress passed the Ertel Amendment in February, no one adjusted
the repeal date of § 1087-3 to coincide with the effective date of the Bankruptcy Act. See
125 CONG. Rsc. H2758 (daily ed. May 7, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Congress at-
tempted to rectify this oversight through the Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 1, 93
Stat. 387, 387, which added a provision similar to § 1087-3 to the former Bankruptcy Code,
but even this action was of limited success because it applied only prospectively. Act of Aug.
14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 2, 93 Stat. 387, 387. Most courts have enforced the nondis-
chargeability of educational loans during the "gap" period. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Georgia
Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 691 F.2d 482 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Williamson, 665 F.2d
683 (5th Cir. 1982); Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aids Bd. v. Lipke, 630 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir.
1980); In re Adamo, 619 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. New York
State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 449 U.S. 843 (1980).
74. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982). Chapter 13 is entitled "Adjustment of Debts of an
Individual with Regular Income."
75. See id. § 1322(a)(1) (1982) (providing "for the submission of all or such portion of
future earnings or other future income of the debtor ... as is necessary for the execution of
the plan").
76. In re Yee, 7 Bankr. 747, 756 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). A debtor seeking to discharge
educational loans, however, would need court approval under both Chapter 7, because of
the "undue hardship" provision, and Chapter 13.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)-(6) (1982). Section 1325(a) provides:
(a).. .[T]he court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) The plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other applicable
provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the
plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount
that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
1100
1985] EDUCATIONAL LOANS 1101
When a debtor completes payments on a confirmed plan, the
debtor is entitled to a discharge of all debts, except as provided for
in section 1328(a).78 A Chapter 13 composition plan thus provides
distinct advantages to the income earning debtor with outstanding
educational loans. First, he can continue to use nonexempt assets
because he does not need to liquidate them.7 9 Second, the debtor is
spared the stigma of bankruptcy" and receives greater protection
of his credit standing than under straight bankruptcy.81 Third, the
debtor benefits from a "bonanza" discharge in section 1328(a),
which even allows for the discharge of educational loans.82 A para-
dox exists between section 523(a)(8), which limits the dis-
chargeability of educational loans in straight bankruptcy, and sec-
tion 1328(a), which provides for the unlimited dischargeability of
educational loans in Chapter 13 cases. This section examines the
legislative history of section 1328(a) to try to find an explanation
(B)(i) the plan provides that the the holder of such claim retain the lien securing
such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply
with the plan.
Id.
In the educational loan context, creditors most frequently contest whether a debtor's
proposed plan satisfies one or more of three tests: (1) the good faith test, § 1325(a)(3); (2)
the best interests of creditors test, § 1325(a)(4); or (3) the feasibility test, § 1325 (a)(6). See,
e.g., In re Scher, 12 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (challenging good faith and feasibil-
ity); In re DeSimone, 6 Bankr. 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (challenging good faith, best inter-
ests of creditors, and feasibility).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982). For the text of § 1328(a), see supra note 4. Section
1328(a) does not except educational loans from discharge. Id.
If the debtor fails to complete payments under the plan, then § 1328(b) and (c) control
the discharge of debts. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b), (c) (1982). Discharges are limited under §
1328(b). A court may grant a discharge to a debtor only if the failure to complete payments
is attributable to circumstances beyond the debtor's control and the value of property dis-
tributed under the plan on each unsecured claim "is not less than the amount.., paid on
such claim if the estate of the debtor had been liquidated." 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1), (2)
(1982). Section 1328(b) limits the extent of the discharge. For example, § 523(a) debts are
excepted from discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2) (1982). Thus, a debtor failing to complete
payments on a confirmed plan would still have to demonstrate "undue hardship" to have
educational loans discharged.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See In re Scher, 12 Bankr. 258, 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a) (1982) with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982). Under § 1328(a) the only nondischarge-
able debts are alimony, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), and long term debts, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
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for this apparent contradiction.
1. Section 6-207(b) of the Bankruptcy Commission Proposal
In an effort to encourage delinquent debtors to use Chapter
13,8 the Bankruptcy Commission decided to facilitate greater use
of partial payment plans.84 To achieve this goal, the Commission
proposed to eliminate some of the unfavorable distinctions be-
tween partial payment plans and full payment plans.8 5 Although
its recommendations would have put partial payment plans nearly
on a par with full payment plans, the Commission retained the dis-
tinction concerning discharges. Under the Commission proposal, a
debtor could receive a discharge of educational loans, a debt listed
in section 4-506(a), only if the debtor completed payments on a
full payment plan. Conversely, a debtor who had satisfied the re-
quirements for confirmation of a partial payment plan and com-
pleted payments would not have received a discharge of his educa-
tional loans under the Commission proposal. 6 Thus, when
Congress received the proposal, it was entirely consistent with the
purpose of section 523(a)(8).
83. Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pt. I, at 159. The disparate use of former
Chapter XIII among the various jurisdictions prompted the Commission's revision. Id. at
157.
84. Under former Chapter XIII, partial payment plans were much less attractive to
debtors than full payment plans for two reasons. First, § 656(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(3)
(1976) (repealed 1978), barred confirmation of a partial payment plan if the debtor "had
been granted a discharge, or had ... a wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed
under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1976) (repealed 1978); see Perry v. Commerce Loan
Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966). Second, debts excepted from discharge in straight bankruptcy
would remain nondischargeable even after completion of a confirmed partial payment plan.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1060-1061 (1976) (repealed 1978).
85. The Bankruptcy Commission endorsed three proposals designed to place partial
payment plans on a par with full payment plans. First, the Commission advocated eliminat-
ing creditor approval of a plan. Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pt. II, at 207. Sec-
ond, the Commission proposed removing the bar to confirmation of partial payment plans
found in 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(3) (1976) (repealed 1978); Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note
44, pt. II, at 207-08. Third, the Commission suggested that conduct which formerly would
have barred a discharge, other than overuse of the bankruptcy system, no longer should
prevent confirmation of either a full payment or partial payment plan. Id. at 207-09; see
Hughes, supra note 3, at 838-39.
86. Section 4-506(a)(8) would prohibit discharging educational loans in straight bank-
ruptcy. Under § 6-207(b) this prohibition would apply to partial payment plans as well.
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2. Section 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
"Something Happened on the Way to the Floor!"
In enacting Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978,s8 Congress shared the Bankruptcy Commission's enthusiasm
for encouraging repayment plans.8 Congress designed Chapter 13
"to enable an individual... to develop and perform under a plan
for the repayment of his debts over an extended period." 89 Expect-
ing that some plans would provide for the full repayment of debts,
while others might offer creditors only "a percentage of their
claims,"90 Congress adopted the Commission strategy of encourag-
ing the use of Chapter 13 by facilitating partial payment plans.91
Congress not only implemented the Commission proposals that
placed partial payment plans on more of a par with full payment
plans, 92 it went one step further: Congress broadened the range of
discharges available upon completion of payments on a partial
payment plan.9 s Although the Commission proposal provided for
the nondischargeability of educational loans for partial payment
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982).
88. According to the legislative history, "[T]he premises of the bill. . . are that use of
the bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that if it is used, debtors should attempt repay-
ment under chapter 13." H.R. Rap. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977). Witnesses
speaking before Congress evinced a desire to work out a repayment plan, if at all possible,
rather than face the trauma of straight bankruptcy. See id. at 117.
89. Id. at 118.
90. Id.
91. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 840.
92. See supra note 85. Congress departed from the Commission proposal regarding a
repayment plan's effect on a later discharge in straight bankruptcy. The Commission propo-
sal suggested a two-year period following the discharge of debts in a partial payment plan
during which courts would deny a straight bankruptcy discharge absent a showing of undue
hardship. Bankr. Comm'n Report, supra note 44, pt. I[ § 4-505(a)(7), at 132-33. The Reform
Act tightened this provision considerably, perhaps manifesting Congress' understanding of
the difference between a substantial repayment and a nominal repayment. See Hughes,
supra note 3, at 841.
Section 727(a)(9) of the Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (1982), bars discharge in
straight bankruptcy if the debtor has received a discharge in a Chapter 13 partial payment
case, commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the petition, unless pay-
ments under the plan in such case totaled at least-
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or
(B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the debtor's
best effort; ...
Id. The apparent purpose of § 727 was to promote full repayment plans and to discourage
offers of nominal repayment. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1977).
93. Unlike the Commission proposal that would have applied all the exceptions to dis-
charge in straight bankruptcy to partial payment plans, § 1328(a) prohibits only the dis-
charge of alimony and long-term debts. See supra notes 78, 82 and accompanying text.
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plans9 4-a standard consistent with the congressional concern ex-
pressed in section 523(a)(8)-no parallel provision in Chapter 13 of
the Reform Act prohibits the discharge of educational loans in
such a case.
Thus, the superdischarge of section 1328(a) grants a debtor
with a regular income a discharge of his educational loans upon
completing payments95 on a Chapter 13 plan that satisfies the re-
quirements of section 1325(a).96 By providing for the broad dis-
charge of debts in section 1328(a), regardless of whether the debtor
offered a full payment or a nominal payment of debts, Congress
effectively, and perhaps unwittingly, encouraged student debtors
to seek discharges of educational loans through nominal payment
plans under Chapter 13. Yet, the legislative history fails to explain
Congress' rationale for omitting from Chapter 13 partial payment
cases the exceptions to discharge that apply in liquidation proceed-
ingsY7 The language of section 1328(b), Chapter 13's hardship pro-
vision, which applies section 523(a) in its entirety to plans in which
the debtor does not complete payments, 9 further confuses the is-
sue. In light of the extensive debate over section 523(a)(8) and the
application of section 523(a) to cases under section 1328(b), the
absence of a stated rationale for the broad dischargeability in sec-
tion 1328(a) would seem to indicate that Congress inadvertently
created this apparent tension between section 523(a)(8) and sec-
tion 1328(a).9 9 Because the courts are left to cope with this tension,
an analysis of the various judicial attempts to resolve this problem
is important.
IV. JUDICIAL REACTION
Courts faced with a Chapter 13 payment plan involving educa-
tional loans must address problems that do not exist in a Chapter
7 straight bankruptcy involving similar debts. If a debtor attempts
to discharge educational loans in a Chapter 7 case, the role of the
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982) (quoted supra note 4).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1982) (quoted supra note 77).
97. Both the House and Senate versions of the Reform Act, H.R. 8200 and S. 2266,
excluded the application of § 523(a) to a completed Chapter 13 plan, with the exceptions
discussed supra note 82. Although Congress thus rejected the Commission approach and the
approach ot the prior Act, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, the reports on each bill
fail to explain the rationale for the exclusion. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 842 n.55.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1982).
99. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 843.
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bankruptcy court is relatively straightforward. 100 The court must
apply section 523(a)(8) and must find "undue hardship" before
discharging any educational loans under the statute.110 The lan-
guage of section 1328(a), on its face, is also straightforward. Unlike
section 523(a)(8), however, section 1328(a) allows the discharge of
educational loans upon completion of payments regardless of
whether full repayment, substantial repayment, or only nominal
repayment occurs.102
Despite the clear language in section 1328(a), it still poses
problems. First, section 1328(a) arguably conflicts with section
523(a)(8), which states that educational loans must be nondis-
chargeable. 03 Second, section 1328(a) erodes the debtor's only re-
maining legal inducement to attempt substantial repayment of
educational loans. Whether payment is five or fifty percent, the
statute seems to require confirmation if the plan satisfies the re-
quirements of section 1325(a).0 4 Because section 1328(b) imposes
the exceptions to discharge from section 523(a) when a debtor fails
to complete payments, Chapter 13 creates an incentive for debtors
to pursue a nominal repayment plan. 05
As student debtors began seeking to discharge educational
loans by filing Chapter 13 petitions with minimal repayment offers,
lending institutions began looking for ways to challenge these com-
position plans. Realizing that the restrictions of section 523(a)(8)
applied to Chapter 13 petitions only if the debtor failed to com-
plete payments, 0 6 lending institutions turned to the best interest
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1982).
101. Courts have had problems defining "undue hardship" on a case by case basis. See
Kosel, supra note 43, at 466-76 (discussing various standards for undue hardship).
102. The plan must satisfy the requirements of § 1325(a), which does not address ex-
pressly the amount of repayment. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. If the creditor
would receive nothing in straight bankruptcy, which is often the result with student borrow-
ers who have few if any nonexempt assets, a nominal payment can satisfy this test.
103. The legislative history, however, fails to explain this apparent inconsistency. See
supra notes 65-73, 87-99 and accompanying text.
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1982) (discussed supra note 77 and accompanying text).
105. In In re McMinn, 4 Bankr. 150 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980), the court pointed out that
the strict discharge provisions in § 1328(b), which apply when a debtor cannot complete
payments, create a disincentive to offer substantial plans that may be more difficult to com-
plete. Id. at 152.
106. For a discussion of Chapter 13's hardship exception, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1982),
see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Notably, only one bankruptcy court has imposed the undue hardship standard of
§ 523(a)(8) in a Chapter 13 case. In In re Gaston, 25 Bankr. 571 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982),
the debtor proposed a plan that offered unsecured creditors four percent of their claims.
Kent State University challenged confirmation, maintaining that a nominal repayment of
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of creditors test and the good faith test of section 1325(a) to chal-
lenge educational loan discharges in Chapter 13.107 Most of the liti-
gation has focused on the appropriate definition and proper appli-
cation of the good faith requirement in section 1325(a)(3).10 8
Courts take three principal approaches to interpreting Chap-
ter 13. Some courts take a strict construction stance, looking only
to the statutory language to resolve disputes. Other courts read a
"substantial and meaningful payment" test into section 1325(a).
four percent violated the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3) because the debtor's pri-
mary intent was to erase the educational debt through the broader discharge available in
Chapter 13. Id. at 572. The court looked to the Sixth Circuit for a definition of good faith,
noting that because Chapter 13 is subject to abuse, the court "must look closely at the
debtor's conduct before confirming a plan." Id. (quoting Memphis Bank and Trust Co. v.
Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982)). The bankruptcy court asserted that it could
find bad faith when a debtor with a potential income capacity that would be sufficient to
satisfy educational loan obligations seeks to discharge those loans in Chapter 13. The court
held that the debtor could not receive confirmation without first establishing undue hard-
ship under § 523(a)(8) and demonstrating that the discharge of educational loans was not
the primary purpose of the suit. 25 Bankr. at 572-73. The court denied confirmation of the
plan because the debtor failed to meet this burden of proof. Id. at 573. The same court had
established this two-pronged burden of proof in three previous cases in which creditors chal-
lenged the discharge of educational loans under the good faith and best interest of creditors
test. See Wright State Univ. v. Novak, 25 Bankr. 459, 461 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (debtor
failed to sustain burden of proof in a plan offering one percent repayment of student loan);
Ohio Student Loan Comm'n v. Wilkinson, 24 Bankr. 474, 476 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (joint
petition filed in bad faith when plan proposed no repayment of educational loan); Ohio
Student Loan Comm'n v. Willis, 24 Bankr. 293, 295 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (plan offering
14% payment on educational loan confirmed because it constituted debtor's "best effort"
and because failure to discharge loans would constitute undue hardship).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982) (authorizing creditors to object to confirmation of the
plan).
Section 1325(a)(4), the best interest of creditors test, provides that a plan must pay as
much to creditors as "would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liqui-
dated under Chapter 7." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982). Creditors concluded that because
educational loans were not dischargeable under Chapter 7, proposed Chapter 13 composi-
tion plans did not pay creditors as much as they would receive under Chapter 7. See In re
Syrus, 12 Bankr. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). In Syrus, however, the court rejected this
contention, stating that a judgment that a debt is nondischargeable does not guarantee full
payment. Id. The court concluded that the proper valuation of the § 1325(a)(4) standard
was the "liquidation value of all nonexempt property minus the chapter 7 administration
expenses." Id.; see In re Yee, 7 Bankr. 747, 759 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. In re McMinn, 4
Bankr. 150 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (holding that for purposes of the best interest of the
creditors test, the legal right to sue on a nondischargeable debt has value in determining the
amount that the debtor would have to pay in straight bankruptcy). More recently, in In re
Ali, 33 Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983), the bankruptcy court implicitly overruled Mc-
Minn by holding that the judge should consider these interests in determining good faith
under § 1325(a)(3) rather than in examining the best interest of the creditors under
§ 1325(a)(4). Id. at 894.
108. See, e.g., In re Dalby, 38 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); In re Hawkins, 38
Bankr. 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Perez, 20 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In
re Syrus, 12 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
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Finally, some courts look to the "totality of the circumstances" to
decide cases. This part of the Recent Development examines these
three approaches in an attempt to determine which test best serves
Congress' intent.
A. The Literal Construction
In re Eichelberger,0 9 one of the earliest good faith decisions,
best typifies the strict construction approach to section 1328(a) in
the context of educational loans. The case concerned a debtor
seeking to discharge educational loans in a Chapter 13 zero pay-
ment plan. 110 The court first acknowledged that section 523 applies
to a Chapter 13 case to the extent that the section is consistent
with the provisions of Chapter 13.11 Analyzing section 1328(a),
however, the court concluded that the prohibition on the discharge
of educational loans in section 523(a)(8) does not apply "when the
debtor makes all payments provided for by the plan pursuant to
section 1328(a)."" 2 Believing that Congress intended to grant
debtors a greater scope of relief in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7,
the court approved the plan even though it provided no payment
to the creditors on the educational loan.113
A year after Eichelberger, the court in In re Scher"" also liter-
ally construed the language of sections 1325(a) and 1328(a). In
Scher, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition with a plan offering
fourteen percent repayment on educational loans composing over
eighty percent of the debtor's unsecured debts." 5 Critical of judi-
cial use of good faith as a vehicle to defeat minimal payment plans,
the court engaged in an in depth discussion of legislative history." 6
109. 6 Bankr. 705 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1980).
110. Id. at 706. In a zero payment plan unsecured creditors receive nothing. Zero pay-
ment plans satisfy the best interest of creditors test in "no asset" cases, however, because
unsecured creditors would receive nothing in a "no asset" liquidation. Thus the creditor is
not receiving "less than" he would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1982).
111. 6 Bankr. at 707. The provisions of § 523 are "applicable to Chapter 13 cases when
not inconsistent with the letter of the Chapter 13 provisions." 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
112. 6 Bankr. at 707-08.
113. Id. at 708. According to the court, "[tihe argument that the plan is not filed in
good faith is warrantless, for the debtors are merely taking advantage of a law which Con-
gress enacted." But see In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (rejecting zero
payment plan that the debtor proposed to discharge educational loans as inconsistent with
congressional intent in Chapter 13); see infra notes 122-43 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Iacovoni).
114. 12 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
115. Id. at 259.
116. Id. at 265-80.
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The court concluded that, in light of the extensive debate in Con-
gress, the legislature clearly drafted section 1328(a) with full
knowledge of the import of the "bonanza" discharge. 117 The court
stated that Congress never indicated in Chapter 13 a minimum
amount that debtors need to offer to unsecured creditors.118 Fur-
thermore, according to the court, the legislative history does not
provide a definitive answer to the good faith question.1 9 In sum,
the court found "no support in the scheme of Chapter 13, nor in its
language, nor in its legislative history ... for judges to read some
kind of percentage [payment] for unsecured creditors into Chapter
13 where Congress did not do so."12O Accordingly, the court held
that the debtor's plan satisfied the good faith requirement.1 21
117. Id. at 272-73. The court further noted that because Congress wrote § 1328(a) so
clearly, many of the best intentioned "bankruptcy judges have tried to fashion some ap-
proach by which student borrowers who have thereby gleaned from our society all that it
has to offer will be brought to book." Id. at 272.
118. Id. at 273.
119. Id. at 273-74. Citing Senate and House Reports, the court found that, at best, the
legislative history acknowledged that a 100% payment to unsecured creditors was necessary
in appropriate cases. The court declared that "[a]t worst, the legislative history, in isolated
references, expresses the hope that debtors left on their own would choose to pay, if not in
full, at least a substantial portion of their debts." Id. at 275 (footnote omitted).
120. Id. The judge noted that he felt no "more comfortable with these cases than [his]
esteemed colleagues." Regardless of whether people agree or disagree that Chapter 13 has
achieved its purposes, the Chapter does not leave judges free "to find want of good faith in
order to defeat a plan because of private notions of what is right or wrong." Id.
121. Id. In re Rowe, 17 Bankr. 870 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982), presents another case ap-
plying a literal construction. In Rowe, the debtors offered 32% payment on unsecured debts
composed: primarily of educational loans. The court was concerned about the apparent dis-
crepancy between Congress' resolute action to make educational loans nondischargeable in
straight bankruptcy and Congress' complete lack of action regarding educational loans in
Chapter 13. Nonetheless, the court premised its decision on the belief that "the provisions
of § 523[(a)(8)] do not apply in a Chapter 13 case." Id. at 871 (emphasis omitted). Feeling
"bound by the law" as stated in § 1325(a) and § 1328(a), the court concluded that the
debtor had satisfied the good faith standard. Id. Concerning the tension between § 523(a)(8)
and § 1328(a), the court stated:
The Court is, as it ought to be, bound by the law. Any remedy lies with Congress.
Like the shoe shop with a sign that reads 'We have an arrangement with the bank. We
cash no checks and they repair no shoes.' I have an arrangement with Congress: I pass
no laws and they repair no shoes.
Id.; see also In re Crawford, 10 Bankr. 815 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (acknowledging dis-
chargeability of student loans following completion of payments of confirmed plan). Other
cases have adopted a strict construction of section 1328(a) outside the context of educa-
tional loans. See, e.g., In re Seely, 6 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (intentional tort); In
re Keckler, 3 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (debt based on forgery).
Judge Conrad Cyr also has argued in favor of a strict construction. See Cyr, supra note
3. Judge Cyr criticized on two grounds courts that ignored "important principles of statu-
tory construction" to imbue good faith with "a radically new meaning" that required some
minimum "substantial" or "meaningful" payments. Id. at 275-77. First, Judge Cyr believed
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B. The Activist Approach: The Substantial and Meaningful
Payment Test
Concerned about the tension between the discharge allowable
under section 1328(a) and the nondischargeability of educational
loans under section 523(a)(8), some courts have rejected the literal
application of section 1325(a). Unwilling to give educational loan
recipients the opportunity to escape their obligations by offering
minimal payments under Chapter 13, these courts have read into
the good faith standard a requirement of "substantial and mean-
ingful payments."
In re Iacovoni122 is the landmark case applying the "substan-
tial and meaningful payments" test. The case concerned a debtor
seeking to discharge educational loans in a zero payment plan.123
The Iacovoni court extensively discussed two questions relevant to
the discharge of educational loans in Chapter 13: (1) whether the
court could confirm a plan providing no payments to unsecured
creditors;1 24 and (2) what degree of repayment the court required
to confirm a Chapter 13 partial payment plan. 2 '
To determine whether a court could confirm a zero payment
plan under Chapter 13, the court first looked to the requirements
of section 1325(a).12 ' The court acknowledged that a debtor whose
assets were entirely exempt seemingly could receive confirmation
of a plan that provided no payments to unsecured creditors be-
cause the debtor would satisfy the "best interest" test.1 27 Nonethe-
less, after careful consideration of the legislative history, the court
concluded "that a plan without payment leaves much of the chap-
this approach was inconsistent with the language of Chapter 13, because embellishing the
meaning of "good faith" runs roughshod over the best interests test in § 1325(a)(4). Id. at
277-78. Furthermore, the courts' varied intrusions into the statutory scheme eroded "the
uniformity to be expected in the administration of an important law of commerce." Id. at
277.
Judge Cyr acknowledged that this judicial activism was a response to the "distressing
abuses of the liberal debtor relief provisions" of Chapter 13. Id. at 279. He preferred a
legislative solution-an ability to pay test-to the judicial legislation taking place through
the application of the good faith test. Id. at 281-88. See infra notes 199-205 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of congressional amendments arguably consistent with Judge Cyr's
recommendations.
122. 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
123. In Iacovoni the court consolidated several cases. This discussion focuses on only
the named case. The common thread running through all the consolidated cases was a zero
payment plan for unsecured creditors. Id. at 258.
124. Id. at 261-65.
125. Id. at 265-68.
126. Id. at 262. See supra note 77 for the text of § 1325(a).
127. Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. at 262.
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ter without meaning . . . . [C]onfirmation of such a plan [would
vitiate] the concept of Chapter 13. ''128 In reaching this conclusion,
the court looked at several factors. First, the court found that the
purpose of Chapter 13 is to encourage repayment. 129 Because Con-
gress phrased the entire statute in terms of "payments made" by
the debtor, 13 0 the court believed Congress intended that a debtor
should escape from loan obligations through the more favorable
discharge provision in Chapter 13 only if he has attempted sub-
stantial repayment.13 1 The court further stated that the require-
ment of a regular income would be meaningless if not to assure the
debtor's ability to make payments. 132 If a substantial payment plan
is not feasible for a debtor, the proceeding properly belongs in
Chapter 7, not Chapter 13.1'"
Having concluded that zero payment plans do not conform to
the purposes of Chapter 13, the court turned to the good faith
standard in section 1325(a)(3) to determine the appropriate level
of payment.' The court found that "good faith" historically had
little inherent meaning. 35 The court, therefore, looked to the in-
tent and purpose of Chapter 13 as a whole to ascertain the appro-
priate meaning of good faith and the degree of payment necessary
to constitute good faith for confirmation purposes.1' Again, the
court focused on Congress' perception that substantial amounts
would be repaid under Chapter 13 plans.3 7 The court noted that
Congress tried to create a system that allowed a debtor to propose
a "reasonable plan for . . . repayment"'3 s of "'most, if not all' of
the claims against the debtor."'3 9 The court concluded that the
spirit and purpose of Chapter 13 called for a substantial or mean-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 262-63; see supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
130. Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. at 263.
131. Id. at 266-67.
132. Id. at 262.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 265.
135. Id.; cf. In re Perez, 20 Bankr. 879, 882 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that "the
term good faith is not new to bankruptcy law"). The Perez court's definition of good faith is
similar to the Iacovoni court's interpretation: the proposed plan must not abuse the "provi-
sions, purpose, or spirit" of Chapter 13. Id. (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY 9.20, at 319
(J. Moore 14th ed. 1978)); see In re Yee, 7 Bankr. 747, 756 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating
that good faith "is not new to bankruptcy law. . . ."; the term requires an inquiry into
whether an abuse of the purpose or spirit of Chapter 13 has occurred).
136. 2 Bankr. at 266.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 267 (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978)).
139. 2 Bankr. at 266.
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ingful repayment.140
Understanding that implementing this standard would require
flexibility, the court kept its legislative hat on and outlined rele-
vant factors that courts should consider in determining whether a
debtor offered a plan in good faith.'4 ' First, courts should examine
the debtor's budget and future income potential to get an idea of
the feasibility of a proposed plan. Next, courts should consider the
repayment percentage and the dollar amount of outstanding debts.
Finally, courts should review the nature of the debts that the
debtor is discharging to determine whether he is using Chapter 13
to escape obligations, or to make a legitimate effort to repay
debts. 42 Using these factors to analyze the debtor's plan, the
Iacovoni court denied confirmation because the debtor's otherwise
nondischargeable educational loans constituted a large share of the
total debt and the payment plan did not offer substantial or mean-
ingful repayment commensurate with the debtor's ability to pay. 43
The court in In re Yee'4 adopted an approach similar to the
approach that the court used in Iacovoni. In Yee a debtor sought
confirmation of a plan offering seven percent repayment on educa-
tional loans. 145 After originally denying confirmation,' 46 the court,
140. Id. at 267. The court carefully distinguished this test from the "best effort" stan-
dard in § 727(a)(9). Id. The court stated:
'[T]o prevent chapter 13 plans from turning into mere offers of composition plans
under which payments would equal only the nonexempt assets of the debtor,' the
debtor must always meet the standard of a "good faith" proposal, which, in light of
Section 727(a)(9), requires something less than "best effort," and, in light of the forego-
ing analysis, may be defined as a good faith effort to make meaningful payment to
holders of unsecured claims.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978)).
141. Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. at 267.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 267-68.
144. 7 Bankr. 747 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
145. Id. at 750.
146. In the previous hearing the Court found that, "in view of the debtor's excellent
education, substantial income, and lack of dependents, the minimal payment plan proposed
was not filed in good faith." Id. Although the court did not find the best effort test appro-
priate, the court concluded that "good faith" means, "a bona fide effort to discharge out-
standing obligations. The token payments offered by the debtor do not represent a bona
fide effort." Id. (emphasis in original).
The debtor sought rehearing, or in the alternative, a conversion to a Chapter 7 case
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (1982). 7 Bankr. at 750. Section 1307(c) states:
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, on request of a party in interest
and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a
case under chapter 7 of this title, or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever
is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause. . ..
11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (1982).
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on rehearing, embarked on an extensive examination of the legisla-
tive history and judicial treatment of Chapter 13.
The court began its analysis by recognizing that section
1328(a), unlike section 523(a)(8), allows the discharge of educa-
tional loans. The court then considered whether the statute em-
powered a court to deny confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that
"proposes minimal . ..payments to creditors, and which would
result in the discharge of student loans of substantial magni-
tude. ' 147 As in Iacovoni, the court found this power in the good
faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3). Unlike lacovoni, however,
the Yee court looked to prior bankruptcy law for a definition of
good faith. Although it took a different route than the Iacovoni
court, the Yee court reached substantially the same conclusion. 148
The Yee court found that to best serve congressional intent,14'
courts should assess the good faith of a proposed plan by reviewing
whether payments are substantial under the circumstances and
whether the debtor's primary purpose in filing the plan was to dis-
charge educational loans.150 In applying this standard, the Yee
court denied confirmation of the debtor's proposed plan because
payment was not substantial and because the debtor's principal
objective in filing under Chapter 13 was to escape the obligation to
repay educational loans in their entirety.1 5 1 Several other courts
147. 7 Bankr. at 751.
148. See id. at 757-58. The court stated:
No rational legislative policy would totally bar student loans from discharge in straight
bankruptcy but permit their avoidance automatically upon payment of a pittance to
creditors. The difference in treatment between student loans in Chapter 7 and in
Chapter 13 is defensible only if the Chapter 13 plan either calls for payments of all
debts in full, as Congress thought most plans would do, or, if it calls for less than full
payment, [sic] that a court determine that, in light of the surrounding circumstances,
including the substantiality of the payments made, that it merits confirmation,
nevertheless.
Id. Although use of the language "in light of the circumstances" seems close to the totality
of circumstances test, the court cited as authority several cases applying a minimum pay-
ment standard. Hence, Yee is best characterized as a substantial and meaningful payment
case.
149. The court, in the context of legislative intent, discussed remedial legislation then
before Congress. Id. at 758.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 758-59. Upon denying confirmation, the court converted the debtor's claim
to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding pursuant to the debtor's request. Id.
In re Littell, 6 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980), presents an interesting reversal of the
conversion concept. The debtors filed a Chapter 7 action seeking to discharge educational
loans because of undue hardship. Although the court concluded that repayment of the com-
plete obligation would impose undue hardship, the court held that, with reasonable effort,
the debtors could make some payment because they both had regular incomes. Thus, by
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have followed Iacovoni and Yee and read into the good faith stan-
dard the requirement that payments must be meaningful or sub-
stantial under the circumstances.
152
C. The Totality of Circumstances Test
Recently, many courts have moved away from strictly constru-
ing Chapter 13 and have not required substantial payment to un-
secured creditors. Although these courts consider the nature of the
debt and the amount of repayment, they do so in a flexible frame-
work, reviewing the "totality of circumstances" to determine
whether the debtor's proposed plan abuses "the principles, pur-
pose, or spirit" of Chapter 13.153
Although several United States courts of appeal have adopted
this test,154 only the Eighth Circuit, in In re Estus,155 has applied
the test in the context of educational loans. In Estus educational
loans composed thirty percent of the unsecured debt. The debtor's
Chapter 13 plan offered no payments to unsecured creditors, and a
judicial fiat, the court converted the case to a Chapter 13 proceeding, and while discharging
one loan, required the debtors to make payments on the other loan constituting a 12% total
repayment. Id. at 89. No other court has taken this approach.
152. See, e.g., In re Hawkins, 33 Bankr. 908, 913-14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying
plan proposing 12% payment to unsecured creditors as contrary to the purposes of Chapter
13, when the plan "proposes to discharge an obligation that is based in [sic] public policy
and that the debtor has a reasonable opportunity to fulfill"); In re Mitruka, 19 Bankr. 516,
518-19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (denying plan as not proposed in good faith because 5.5%
payments were not "meaningful"); In re Ponanski, 11 Bankr. 661, 663 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981)
(rejecting plan proposing 22% repayment on predominantly educational loans because not
proposed in good faith); In re Smith, 8 Bankr. 543, 547-48 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (denying
confirmation of a plan proposing discharge of loans, two-thirds of which were otherwise non-
dischargeable educational loans, with a repayment of 16% because the debtor did not meet
"good faith" requirement and because the proceeding did not belong in Chapter 13); In re
Murallo, 4 Bankr. 666, 668-69 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (because Congress "did not intend the
liberal provisions of Chapter 13 to be used as a disguised Chapter 7 [1]iquidation," court
rejected 10% repayment plan for providing less than substantial payments to creditors); In
re DeSimone, 6 Bankr. 89, 91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (rejecting a plan because "a repay-
ment of $360 towards a $23,370.05 [debt] is contrary to the statutory scheme and legislative
history with respect to Chapter 13."). But see In re Syrus, 12 Bankr. 605, 608 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1981) (confirming a plan as proposed in good faith where debtor offered 70% repay-
ment to unsecured creditors on educational loans).
153. See State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Johnson, 43 Bankr. 1016, 1019 (E.D. Va.
1984) (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy 1 9.20 at 319 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978)).
154. See, e.g., Public Fin. Corp. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1983); Flygare v.
Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983);
Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Barnes, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir.
1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
155. 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982).
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creditor challenged the plan for lack of good faith.156 Referring to
several circuit court decisions rejecting the substantial and mean-
ingful payment test,157 the Eighth Circuit agreed that "good faith
does not impose a rigid and unyielding requirement of substantial
payment to unsecured creditors."'158 The court held that to perform
a proper inquiry into good faith, courts should consider "whether
the plan constitutes an abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of
Chapter 13. ''159 To reach a decision, courts must make a case by
case analysis into the totality of circumstances. The court pro-
ceeded to enumerate a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors.1 0 Af-
156. Id. at 312.
157. See cases cited supra note 154.
158. 695 F.2d at 316. The court noted that requiring a per se minimum payment "to
unsecured creditors as an element of good faith would infringe on the desired flexibility of
Chapter 13." Conversely, the court found that it could not conclude perfunctorily that a
debtor acts in good faith whenever he satisfies the minimal requirements of the best interest
of creditors test in section 1325(a)(4). Id. The bankruptcy judge in In re Perez, 20 Bankr.
879 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982), fleshed out this reasoning more clearly. In discussing the ten-
sion resulting from de minimus payments, the court stated:
For example, the best interest of creditors test will only require a diminimus [sic] re-
payment percentage when the debtor's chapter 7 proceeding would be a no asset case.
Thus to deny confirmation for lack of good faith and base the denial exclusively on the
proposed repayment percentage would be in fact to implicitly repeal the best interests
of creditors test. Similarly, to allow the nondischargeability of a debt in chapter 7 to
bar confirmation of a chapter 13 plan for lack of good faith in effect reads the liberal
discharge provisions of section 1328(a) out of chapter 13.
Moreover, a similar result obtains from the view that a proposed plan may not be
denied confirmation for lack of good faith where the plan meets all of the other re-
quirements of chapter 13. That approach writes the good faith provision out of chapter
13 thereby ignoring the rule of construction that calls for a statute to be read so as to
give meaning to each provision. Clearly, the good faith provision should not be read in
derogation of other provisions of the Code, but neither should other provisions be read
so as to remove from consideration factors properly within the good faith inquiry.
Id. at 882. The court implicitly applied a totality of circumstances analysis in concluding
that the debtor, who proposed a 25% repayment of debts comprised exclusively of educa-
tional loans, did not propose the plan in good faith. Specifically, the court noted that the
debtor had discharged all other debts in a recent Chapter 7 proceeding and that the pay-
ments under the plan were similar to the debtor's regular monthly payments, except that
plan payments continued for a much shorter period of time. Id. at 883.
159. 695 F.2d at 316.
160. Id. at 317. The court listed the following factors:
(1) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debtor's surplus;
(2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of future increases
in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan;
(4) the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and percentage repay-
ment of unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the
court;
(5) the extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;
(6) the extent to which secured claims are modified;
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ter a cursory examination of the facts in light of these factors, the
court found an apparent lack of good faith.161
Lower courts are applying the "totality of circumstances" test
with ever greater frequency.16 2 Most recently, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia applied the
test in In re McAloon. es The debtors filed a Chapter 13 plan offer-
ing twenty-five percent payment on unsecured debts composed of
seventy-seven percent educational loans.16 4 The creditor objected
to confirmation of the plan, alleging lack of good faith because con-
firmation would allow the debtors to discharge the educational
loans while retaining property that the debtors acquired after they
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is nondis-
chargeable in Chapter 7;
(8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses;
(9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act;
(10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief; and
(11) the burden which the plan's administration would place upon the trustee.
Id. In the cases cited supra note 154, the courts looked at similar factors.
161. 695 F.2d at 317. Because the lower courts had not made specific findings regard-
ing the totality of circumstances, the court remanded for further proceedings. Id.
162. See, e.g., In re Vensel, 39 Bankr. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (within court's
sound discretion to find that 11% repayment on educational loans composing 53% of un-
secured debt constitutes good faith); In re All, 33 Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (after
reviewing 11 factors, court found that in light of exceptional medical expenses and possible
dischargeability of educational loans in Chapter 7, the debtor proposed his zero payment
plan in good faith); In re Martini, 28 Bankr. 932 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (In confirming a
plan offering 10% repayment on educational loans as proposed in good faith, the court ex-
amined the amount of payment proposed as one of many elements of the good faith inquiry.
Furthermore, the debtor could have waited a few months and received a complete dis-
charge.); In re Severs, 28 Bankr. 61 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (confirming a plan offering 25%
repayment on educational loans because testimony evinced a sincere desire to repay "as
much as possible," and creditors offered no evidence of bad faith). But see State Educ.
Assistance Auth. v. Johnson, 43 Bankr. 1016 (E.D. Va. 1984) (district court vacating and
remanding because bankruptcy court had failed to make determination of good faith accord-
ing to totality of circumstances test concerning plan offering 5% repayment on unsecured
debt comprising 80% educational loans); In re Dalby, 38 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984)
(after reviewing several factors, court found good faith lacking when plan called for 30%
repayment on unsecured debt comprising 96% educational loans); In re Gunn, 37 Bankr.
432 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (reviewing Estus factors and finding lack of good faith because
debtors had assumed lifestyle beyond their means); In re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 67 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1984) (no good faith when plan offered 10% repayment of educational loans com-
posing over 84% of unsecured debts); In re Hawkins, 33 Bankr. 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(reviewing Estus factors and finding lack of good faith when debtor easily could satisfy loan
obligation to State of Maine by returning to practice veterinary medicine there); In re
Canda, 33 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (no good faith when debtor is judgment proof and
does not need Chapter 13); In re Perez, 20 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussed
supra note 158).
163. 3 BANKm L. REP. (CCH) 1 70,187 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
164. Id. at 86,273.
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incurred the educational debt.15 The court discussed the tension
between section 523(a)(8) and section 1328(a), but noted that Con-
gress liberalized the discharge available in Chapter 13 to encourage
repayment plans. 6 The court then turned to the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test in making the good faith inquiry, believing that
this test best implemented Congress' intent.167 Noting that a per se
substantial repayment requirement was inappropriate, the court
emphasized the importance of preventing abuses of the purpose or
spirit of Chapter 13.168
The court first found that the twenty-five percent repayment
on unsecured debts largely consisting of educational loans did not
alone constitute bad faith.' 9 The court then analyzed the debtors'
financial situation and employment history. Although the debtors'
circumstances worsened as a result of some unwise purchases, the
court ruled that the debtors were entitled to judicial protection
while they attempted to solve their problems. 70 Finally, the court
held that the forty-two month period of payments did not create
an inference of bad faith. Accordingly, the court confirmed the
debtors' plan.'7 '
V. ANALYSIS
To determine which judicial approach is most appropriate,
courts need to understand the policy considerations motivating
Congress' decision to except educational loans from discharge in
Chapter 7. Furthermore, to the extent that Congress made a con-.
scious decision to allow the discharge of educational loans in Chap-
ter 13, courts must understand the policy considerations behind
that decision. Before deciding which of the judicial approaches
best serves congressional intent, therefore, it is necessary to deter-
mine the focus of that intent.
165. Id. at 86,274-75.
166. Id. at 86,275.
167. Id. The court cited Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982), as authority
for the "totality of circumstances" test, but also mentioned Estus. See 3 BANM L. REP.
(CCH) at 86,275 n.3.
168. 3 BANKE. L. REP. (CCH) at 86,275 (citing Deans, 692 F.2d at 972).
169. 3 BANK&. L. REP. (CCH) at 86,275-76.
170. Id. at 86,276-77.
171. Id. at 86,277.
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A. Legislative Intent
Two concerns were primarily responsible for Congress' initial
action to limit the dischargeability of educational loans.'7 2 First,
Congress perceived educational loans as unique obligations, "made
without business considerations, without security, without cosign-
ers, . . . as a mortgage on the debtor's future."'73 Second, several
highly publicized bankruptcies, 74 involving the discharge of tens of
thousands of dollars in educational loans, whirled Congress into a
"chicken little" mentality. These isolated incidents and sparse sup-
porting data were sufficient to spark congressional concern about
student borrowers' eroding sense of obligation to repay educational
loans and about the future solvency of the loan programs.7 5 To
172. The first limitation on dischargeability appeared in the Guaranteed Student Loan
Amendments of 1976. See supra note 49.
173. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977).
174. According to the legislative history, "a few serious abuses of the bankruptcy laws
by debtors with large amounts of educational loans . . . generated the movement for an
exception to discharge." Id. The discharge of educational loans in bankruptcy had attracted
much media attention. See Bankruptcy Hearings, supra note 51, at 1076-1122 (references to
various news articles); Letter from Representative Erlenborn to Representative Butler (June
14, 1977), reprinted in H.R. Rm'. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 156-57 (1977) (reference to
article in N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at Al, col. 4).
175. Proponents of the exception to discharge relied on a study performed by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare Office of Education that demonstrated an
increase in the number of student borrowers discharging educational loans in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Claims Paid on GSL's
Fiscal Year Number Amount
1966-70 348 $0.4 million
1971 943 1.0 million
1972 1342 1.6 million
1973 2259 2.8 million
1974 2914 3.8 million
1975 4559 6.8 million
Total 12365 16.4 million
Bankruptcy Hearings, supra note 51, at 1077 (testimony of Edward T. York, Jr.) (Jan. 19,
1976). Mr. York testified that bankruptcies accounted for four percent of total losses and
emphasized that the Office of Education expected bankruptcies to increase as collection ef-
forts became more effective. Id. One congressman testified that student loan bankruptcies
presented a problem of "serious proportions and consequences," which "[had] not yet
reached catastrophic or crippling magnitude," but nevertheless required urgent action. Id.
at 1091 (testimony of Rep. Erlenborn).
Opponents of the exception argued that because total losses from defaults and bank-
ruptcies equaled 16% of the loans in repayment status, the loss due to the bankruptcies
amounted to less than one percent of the mature loans. HR. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 73-74 (1976) (individual view of Rep. O'Hara on H.R. 14070). Furthermore, although
student loan bankruptcies had increased in absolute terms, they had not increased as a
percentage of loan volume. Bankruptcy Hearings, supra note 51, at 981 (statement of Judge
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Congress, the "sky was falling" on the student loan programs.
Congress next reviewed the dischargeability of educational
loans when it considered the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. This
time, Congress was of sounder mind and had access to more statis-
tical data. Armed with the GAO study of bankruptcy losses in the
student loan programs, which Congress had requested during the
previous debates on the dischargeability of educational loans, 7 6
the House Judiciary Committee realized that Congress' previous
concerns were unfounded. Specifically, the GAO report showed
that "the percentage of claims paid due to bankruptcy has re-
mained relatively stable."'7 In addition, the percentage of ma-
tured educational loans discharged in bankruptcy compared favor-
ably with the percentage in the consumer finance field, indicating
that perhaps Congress had overreacted to the declining sense of
obligation among student borrowers. 178 Finally, the GAO report
demonstrated that bankruptcy losses were nominal when com-
pared with losses resulting from poor operation of the loan
programs. 79
Beyond pointing out this new statistical data, critics of the ex-
ception to discharge argued that they could find no reason for dis-
criminating against student borrowers and placing them on a par
with felons.180 In addition, legislators challenged the categorization
of educational loans as unique. These legislators found educational
loans analogous to medical loans, which are not made for business
reasons, and do not give rise to tangible assets available for repos-
session. Like educational loans, medical loans enable individuals to
return to society as productive members, yet medical loans are not
dischargeable.' With these thoughts in mind, the House Judiciary
Clive W. Bare) (Dec. 10, 1975); H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1976) (individ-
ual view of Rep. O'Hara on H.R. 14070). Judge Bare stated that "bankruptcy losses do not
appear to present any great threat to the program." Bankruptcy Hearings, supra note 51, at
981 (statement of Judge Clive W. Bare) (Dec. 10, 1976). In addition, one congressman criti-
cized the proposal for attempting to remedy a "'scandal' which exists primarily in the imag-
ination." H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1976) (individual view of Rep. O'Hara
on H.R. 14070).
176. See supra note 56.
177. Letter from Elmer B. Staats to Representative Edwards (Dec. 23, 1976), re-
printed in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1977).
178. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977).
179. See Letter from Elmer B. Staats to Representative Edwards (Dec. 23, 1976), re-
printed in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1977).
180. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1977) ("Treating students ... as
... suspected frauds and felons is no substitute for improving the administration of the
program.").
181. Letter from Representative Edwards to Representative Erlenborn (June 16,
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Committee voted twenty-three to four to eliminate the exception
to discharge. 182
Not content to let the matter rest, the original proponents of-
fered on the House floor an amendment to incorporate the excep-
tion to discharge into Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 3 The
legislative history does not explain why the amendment did not
except educational loans from Chapter 13. Once again, each side
gave its views and statistics on the issue. Speaking in favor of the
amendment, one legislator acknowledged that program losses due
to bankruptcies were not the real problem. Maintaining that the
problem was moral, not financial, the legislator focused on the irre-
sponsible attitude that student loan bankruptcies symbolized.18 4
Another legislator countered that educational loan programs were
"conceived as a social welfare program, both for the students in-
volved and for the nation as a whole."'185 As with any general social
legislation, associated costs result. 186 Furthermore, the vast major-
ity of the loss was attributable to program mismanagement, not to
bankruptcies.187 Despite this range of sound arguments for treating
educational loans the same as other dischargeable loans, Congress
enacted the exception to discharge. 88 The rationale for this deci-
sion, however, remains unclear. 89
The House never discussed the ramifications of a Chapter 13
discharge during the debate on educational loans. Indeed, in light
of the House Judiciary Committee vote to eliminate the exception
to discharge for educational loans, it is not surprising that Con-
gress did not include educational loans in the discharge exceptions
1977), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1977).
182. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, Representative
Michel failed to comprehend that regardless of the debtor or the type of debt, the funda-
mental premise of bankruptcy law implicitly fosters individual irresponsibility. His rationale
for selecting students as his target remains obscure when his comments apply to any person
who takes advantage of the bankruptcy laws.
185. Letter from Representative Edwards to Representative Erlenborn (June 16,
1977), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1977).
186. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 134 (1977); see supra note 71.
187. Congressman Dodd indicated that over 90% of program losses were attributable
to defaults-an administrative problem that the bankruptcy laws could not cure. 124 CONG.
REc. H1792-93 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (statements by Rep. Dodd).
188. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
189. In light of the weak statistical support for excepting educational loans from dis-
charge, the only reason for passage of the amendment must have been the perceived politi-
cal need to curb "serious abuses" of the bankruptcy laws. See supra note 174 and accompa-
nying text.
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in section 1328(a). Yet, this omission does create an apparent con-
flict. Courts faced with a confirmation decision regarding a Chap-
ter 13 partial payment plan that concerns educational loans, none-
theless, should review the policy considerations outlined in
Chapter 7. Courts also must consider an additional factor. Because
Congress created incentives in Chapter 13 to encourage debtors
with regular income to file a Chapter 13 petition rather than opt
for liquidation, courts must consider the extent to which the avail-
ability of a discharge of educational loans in section 1328(a) oper-
ates as an incentive to debtors to elect Chapter 13. Because the
evaluation of whether an educational loan is dischargeable requires
a different equation in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7, courts can
read the two chapters so that each is consistent with the other.
The structure and legislative history of Chapter 13 clearly in-
dicate that one of Congress' express and overriding policy concerns
in reforming the Bankruptcy Code was to facilitate greater use of
Chapter 13.190 The dischargeability of educational loans encourages
greater use of Chapter 13. In contrast, Congress' policy rationales
for excepting educational loans from discharge in straight bank-
ruptcy are of questionable validity. The resulting discriminatory
treatment of student borrowers conflicts with the twin policies of
the bankruptcy laws-a fresh start for the debtor and equal treat-
ment of all debts and creditors. 191 Furthermore, the special treat-
ment that Congress gives "unique" educational loans is difficult to
justify when similarly structured medical loans do not receive like
protection.192 Finally, the GAO report specifically discredited the
argument that student loan bankruptcies posed any risk to the fi-
nancial stability of the loan programs.193 Thus, the only remaining
foundation for limiting the discharge of educational loans rests in
the political and moral dimension-Congress' desire to halt the
well-publicized "serious abuses" and thereby lend moral support to
students demonstrating individual responsibility by repaying their
loans.194 When an educational loan debtor seeks confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan, therefore, courts clearly should give greater
weight to Congress' express decision to foster repayment plans
under Chapter 13 than to Congress' weakly supported decision to
except educational loans from discharge in liquidations. Accord-
190. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
191. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133-34 (1977).
192. See supra text accompanying note 181.
193. See supra notes 56, 177-79 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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ingly, courts should circumscribe the broad discharge available in
Chapter 13 by denying confirmation of a student loan debtor's pro-
posed plan only when the proposed plan would constitute a "seri-
ous abuse" of Chapter 13 by offering payments not commensurate
with the debtor's ability to pay.
B. Judicial Approach
The judiciary has attempted to resolve the conflict between
section 1328(a) and section 523(a)(8) through the good faith in-
quiry that courts must make before confirming a proposed partial
payment plan. A review of the various approaches reveals that the
"totality of circumstances" approach best serves congressional in-
tent because this approach both encourages the use of Chapter 13
and provides a means of limiting "serious abuses" of Chapter 13.
The courts adopting the "literal" construction'95 virtually have
read the good faith requirement out of section 1325(a) by confirm-
ing any plan that satisfies the other requirements of section
1325(a). 9 6 Although the literal approach fosters the use of Chapter
13, this approach does not allow for an inquiry into whether a plan
constitutes a "serious abuse" of the spirit or purpose of Chapter
13. The courts adopting the "substantial and meaningful pay-
ments" test,197 on the other hand, assure that no "serious abuses"
of Chapter 13 will occur. But, by requiring a "minimum" percent-
age of payment these courts discourage the use of Chapter 13 by
circumscribing too tightly the flexibility that Congress intended to
provide debtors in Chapter 13.
The "totality of circumstances" approach 98 avoids the short-
comings of both the literal approach and the substantial and
meaningful payments approach. First, courts applying the totality
of circumstances test do not discourage a debtor from selecting
Chapter 13, because the test does not require a minimum percent-
age repayment. Second, by reviewing all factors relevant to the de-
sign, feasibility, and intent of a proposed plan when making a good
faith inquiry, these courts also assure that a debtor's plan does not
abuse "the principles, purpose, or spirit" of Chapter 13.
195. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 158 (Perez court's discussion of statutory construction).
197. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
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C. 1984 Amendments
In the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984199 Congress affirmed that courts should continue to use the
totality of circumstances approach when deciding whether to con-
firm a Chapter 13 partial payment plan.20 0 Although Congress did
not rectify the discrepant treatment of educational loans in section
523(a)(8) and section 1328(a), Congress did amend section
1325(b). 20 1 Under the amended section 1325(b), if an unsecured
creditor holding an allowable claim objects to confirmation of a
proposed plan, the court may approve the plan only if it provides
the creditor the entire amount of the claim, or if it "provides that
all of the debtor's projected disposable income. . . will be applied
to make payments under the plan. '20 2
To date, there have not been any cases interpreting or apply-
ing the new section 1325(b), but its operation is easy to discern. In
determining whether a debtor's proposed plan calls for a debtor to
apply all disposable income toward payments under the plan,
courts will need to review carefully the proposed budget of the
debtor. The statute defines disposable income as income "not rea-
sonably necessary . . . for the maintenance or support of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor. '20 3 In evaluating the debtor's
budget, the proposed payments, and the amount of income reason-
ably necessary to cover maintenance and support expenses, courts
will make virtually the same inquiry they have been making under
the totality of circumstances approach. Instead of relating this ju-
dicial review to the good faith inquiry under section 1325(a)(3),
however, courts now have express authority to make this review
under the revised section 1325(b).
By requiring debtors, including educational loan debtors, to
contribute all disposable income toward payments under a Chapter
13 plan, section 1325(b) promotes both of the policies furthered by
the totality of circumstances approach. First, section 1325(b) does
not discourage debtors from electing Chapter 13 because it does
not require a minimum percentage repayment. A debtor may offer
either nominal or substantial payments as long as the payments
199. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333.
200. See id. at § 317, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1982)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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constitute all the debtors' disposable income.204 Second, section
1325(b) will prevent abuses of the purpose and spirit of Chapter 13
because the disposable income formula ensures that the payments
under a debtor's plan will be commensurate with a debtor's ability
to pay.
The new section 1325(b) does create some potential problems,
especially concerning the requirement in section 1325(a)(6) that
the debtor "be able to make all payments under the plan.M0 5 By
requiring that all disposable income "be applied to make payments
under the plan," section 1325(b) would seem to require the maxi-
mum feasible repayment. Yet, section 1325(a)(6) prohibits courts
from affirming a plan if the debtor will not be able to make all
payments. While section 1325(a)(6) suggests a range of acceptable
payments, not to exceed the maximum feasible amount that the
debtor will be able to repay, section 1325(b) suggests that only the
maximum feasible amount is acceptable for confirmation. If courts
construe section 1325(b) literally, debtors engaged in repayment
plans are likely to be thrust into section 1328(b) 206 hardship status
upon suffering any financial setback because they will lack the fi-
nancial "cushion" needed to meet both their support needs and
the payments under the plan. Courts can assist debtors in avoiding
this dilemma by continuing to review the debtor's budget and pro-
posed payments with the flexibility of the totality of circumstances
approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly one decade ago, fearing potential losses from student
loan bankruptcies, Congress responded to perceived abuses of the
bankruptcy laws by limiting the dischargeability of educational
loans in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. For reasons not explained in the
legislative history, Congress did not place a corresponding limita-
tion in the discharge provision of Chapter 13, thus creating an ap-
parent tension that the courts have resolved through various
204. For example, if a debtor applies all disposable income to payments to be made
under a Chapter 13 plan, but the payments would result in a repayment of only five percent
of an objecting unsecured creditor's claim, the court, nevertheless, must confirm the plan. If
a debtor's plan proposed payments resulting in a repayment of 50% of an objecting un-
secured creditor's claim, however, the court nonetheless would be compelled to deny confir-
mation of the plan if the debtor did not commit all disposable income to the plan.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1982). Section 1325(a) provides that a "court shall con-
firm a plan if ... (6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan." Id.
206. See supra notes 78, 98 and accompanying text.
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approaches.
When considering whether to confirm a Chapter 13 partial
payment plan that involves educational loans, courts have increas-
ingly used the totality of circumstances approach to determine
whether the debtor's plan was proposed in good faith or consti-
tuted an abuse of the purpose and spirit of Chapter 13. This ap-
proach best serves the dual interests of encouraging Chapter 13
plans and limiting the occasions of abuse. The new section 1325(b)
admittedly negates the need for courts to engage in this type of
inquiry through the mechanism of the "good faith" requirement.
Nonetheless, when making "disposable income" determinations
under section 1325(b), courts still should employ the flexible ap-
proach found in the totality of circumstances test.
Jerome M. Organ
